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Abstract The need for intermediaries to access resources, seek opportunities and 
mitigate risks has been observed in societies across the world. In poor people’s lives 
such actors are often violent, however why this is the case remains under exam-
ined. This article offers a response to this question from Bangladesh based on an 
understanding of political order. When violence is not consolidated by a central 
state, political order stems from balancing the interests of diverse violence special-
ists dispersed throughout society. In such contexts mediating access to resources can 
be a means by which these actors accrue power and wealth, helping explain the link 
between intermediation and violence. This argument is developed through an eth-
nographic case of labourers in a large bazar at the centre of Dhaka city. The case 
illuminates the dynamics of political factionalism and violent mobilization within a 
fractious period in Bangladesh’s recent history.
Keywords Violence · State · Intermediation · Brokerage · Labour · Politics · 
Bangladesh
Do you know what Bangladeshi politics is? It’s capture, beat, cut, slash, rip, escape!
Salam, a labourer at Karwan Bazar, Dhaka
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Introduction
The jupri (shack) group, as they are known locally, are a group of labourers who 
unload vegetables and live at Karwan Bazar, a large fresh goods wholesale market 
at the centre of Dhaka city. By day until late evening many members of the group 
rest adjacent to a government building, often splayed out on their flat backed 
rickshaw vans, awaiting the arrival of delivery trucks to unload, and the night of 
work ahead. The group come from all corners of Bangladesh, having been aban-
doned by their families or running away from home in childhood, and growing up 
together at the bazar. As children many were thieves, stealing and selling vegeta-
bles, partly living in NGO run shelters where friendships formed. Now older, in 
their late teens to thirties, together they are one of the main groups of labourers at 
the country’s largest fruit and vegetable wholesale market. For some of them, the 
spot by the side of the bazar, which by day is sheltered from view by dilapidated 
buses, is also their home.
Visiting the bazar one day in late December 2014, I found the group had 
deserted their usual area, and I was leaving when I bumped into Abul, an older 
member of the group. Abul spoke to me in short whispers, looking over my 
shoulder and without explaining why, beckoned me to come with him. Weaving 
our way through the bazar he took me to a far flung corner I had not been to 
before, up a small staircase and to a lonely tea stall, where I found a couple of 
others in the group looking downcast, including one of the leaders, Rubel. Over 
the preceding weeks the jupri group had wrestled control of contracts for unload-
ing carrots from a rival labour leader, however were now out of their depth. They 
had had to fight off a faction of the Chattro League (the student wing of the rul-
ing political party, the Awami League) employed by the rival leader to reclaim 
control and were now facing multiple police cases, meaning key members of their 
group were ferari (fugitives) as they described it, and were being monitored by 
police informers. After discussing the group’s situation over tea and a cigarette, 
Rubel asked me ‘do you have anyone who could help us?’ The senior local figure 
they knew would cost ‘taka, taka, taka’ to pay off the police, Abul explained, and 
they were also at a serious disadvantage, being aligned to the Bangladesh Nation-
alist Party (BNP), the political party in opposition. I was unable to help, I ‘had’ 
no-one I was clear, but wished them well. Before I left the group I heard them 
plan their next move, with Rubel instructing the group to get some monkey tuppee 
(balaclava) and attack the Chattro League that night.
The most striking feature of this vignette is not that the dynamics described are 
unusual or particularly extreme, but rather that they are commonplace. Though 
the setting here is a city market, the portrayal of violent struggles to control 
resources, the entanglement of police and party political actors in local affairs, 
and the search for relationships to mitigate the violence of others, can be heard 
from across Dhaka and wider Bangladesh (Devine 2002; Ruud 2014; Suykens 
2015). It has been argued that in the Global South, rather than see ‘citizens’ and 
the state as having a direct relationship through democratic forms of accountabil-
ity and governance, we should think of a ‘state-intermediary-citizen’ relationship, 
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where people depend on varied types of intermediaries or brokers (these terms 
are used synonymously in this article) to access the state and market, and to rep-
resent their interests (Auyero 2001; Von Lieres and Piper 2014). In South Asia, 
the sense that intermediation is pervasive has led others to write of ‘intermedia-
tion societies’ (Wood 2010) or a ‘mediated state’ (Berenschot 2010). An impor-
tant and yet neglected characteristic to such intermediation, which emerges 
clearly in the description of the jupri group above, is violence. Indeed in some 
contexts—although certainly not all—an ability to use violence is a key skill of 
intermediaries, and one which is essential to them maintaining and gaining status. 
The relationship between violence and intermediation has however been under-
appreciated empirically, and there has been little attempt to offer a theoretical 
account of why, in certain contexts, intermediaries are violent.
This article examines this question through the case of the jupri labourers, and 
proposes understanding violent intermediation in relation to political order. In many 
societies, including Bangladesh, it can be argued that political order rests not on the 
monopolisation of violence by a central state, but on a balance of power between 
diverse ‘violence specialists’ (North et al. 2009; Khan 2010). Such violence special-
ists vary widely in character, and can include gangs, mafia, political factions and 
the police; actors who operate in relationships of mutual support and collaboration, 
as well as competition (Arias 2017). In Bangladesh it is the state security forces as 
well as political factions within or aligned to the ruling Awami League party who 
are currently dominant, and are organised throughout society down to the grass-
roots. Political order in Bangladesh is premised on such actors maintaining power, 
for which accruing and distributing resources is critical. The proposition here is that 
intermediation can be an important means by which such violence specialists con-
trol and accumulate resources. When political order is contingent on the inclusion of 
diverse violence specialists, this may help explain why in certain contexts, interme-
diaries are often violent. The empirical narrative through which these arguments are 
both developed and explored contributes to an understanding of intermediation in 
Dhaka and Bangladesh, drawing particular attention to the role of labour leaders as 
pivotal to understanding the lowest levels of violence specialists, factionalism, and 
the organisation of political violence.
These arguments are built from an ethnography conducted in Dhaka between 
February 2014 and March 2015. Research centred on Karwan Bazar, which is situ-
ated at the heart of the city, adjacent to a five star hotel, the country’s major media 
outlets, near a high end shopping centre and a bosti (slum) along the railway line 
which at the time was the city’s largest open drugs market. The approach taken is 
political ethnography (Auyero 2001; Baiocchi and Connor 2008; Berenschot 2011), 
with an emphasis on access to resources and their negotiation (Ribot and Peluso 
2003). Research focused on the lives of both children and adults living at the bazar, 
many of whom came to the bazar in childhood because of family abandonment or 
abuse. Most male labourers with such backgrounds work within the jupri group, who 
transport sacks of vegetables between rural middlemen (bepari) and urban wholesal-
ers (aratdar, “commission agents”) on the back of their flat backed rickshaw vans. 
The primary method deployed was participant observation with the group, working 
alone and spending long periods together before or during work, both by day and 
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night. The intensity of this built incrementally as my relationship with the group 
developed, however I was forced to take a step back in early 2015 when key mem-
bers of the group were arrested by the elite security force, the Rapid Action Batal-
lion (RAB). Relationships were initially built through a nearby NGO with which I 
was informally associated. The names of the labour group and individuals have been 
anonymised.
Violent Intermediaries and Political Order
Violent Intermediaries
Liberal notions of citizenship, civil society and the state reflect a particular under-
standing of state-society relations, dominant characteristics of which are univer-
sal rights enshrined in laws and democratic forms of governance underpinned by 
a central state monopolising the means of violence. It is widely acknowledged 
that these characteristics remain distant ideals in the everyday lives of ‘citizens’ in 
most of the world, even where societies ostensibly embody such values (Chatter-
jee 2004). Attempts to understand state-society relations in the Global South have 
instead drawn attention to relationships of intermediation or brokerage, which have 
been identified as pervasive across the world (Auyero 2001; Bierschenk et al. 2002; 
Von Lieres and Piper 2014; Stokes et al. 2013; Tilly 2003; Wolf 1956). At its most 
basic brokerage can be understood as the ‘production of a new connection between 
previously unconnected sites’ (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, p. 31). Wolf (1956: 1076), 
for example, portrays brokers as actors who ‘stand guard over the crucial junctures 
of synapses of relationships which connect the local system to the larger whole’. 
While research on brokerage has deep historical roots within the social sciences 
(Bierschenk et  al. 2002), its re-emergence since the 1990s brought a particular 
interest in the dynamics of political brokerage, where political competition unfolds 
through brokers who facilitate relationships of exchange and mutual support (Auy-
ero 2001; Gay 1998; Stokes et  al. 2013). A common underlying argument is that 
different forms of intermediation exist to enable people to make claims on the state, 
access resources and the market; and that such actors are often critical to political 
competition.
In practice a vast array of resources, broadly defined, have been observed as 
mediated, including employment and labour markets, the ability to trade, housing, 
state services, justice and personal security. Similarly, a wide range of actors have 
been identified as brokers. Auyero’s (2001, p. 58) analysis of the ‘problem-solving 
networks that link “clients,” brokers, and political patrons’ at the grass roots in 
Buenos Aires, for example, highlights: ‘NGO leaders, development agents, peasant 
association chairmen, association activists, facilitators, co-ordinators, politicians, 
clerks…’ (Ibid: 20). The ways in which such actors broker access to resources are 
often not defined and regulated within the law, but operate ‘informally’, even if they 
are widespread and systematic. Studies have highlighted the complex and diverse 
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roles brokers play, particularly in poor communities. Brokers can be charismatic fig-
ures (Hansen and Verkaaik 2009) who attend to desires for belonging and support 
(Auyero 2001). At the same time, the dependencies people have on these figures are 
often conceptualised through the language of patron-clientelism.1 As such they are 
seen as highly complex, and closely associated with the replication of poverty (Auy-
ero 2001; Wood 2003). Auyero (2001, p. 70) argues that they reflect ‘relations of cli-
entelist domination’, and Wood (2003, p. 455) conceptualises such relationships as 
‘Faustian bargains’. Simplistic distinctions between forms of brokerage, such as that 
between political ‘clientelism’ and ‘civil society’, break down under closer inspec-
tion, with for example NGOs in some cases operating through and reinforcing clien-
telist relations (Devine 2002).
A neglected dynamic to intermediation is its relationship to violence (Meehan 
and Plonski 2017; Wheeler 2014), and yet this relationship appears pervasive. As 
Tilly (2003, pp. 34–36) argues, political entrepreneurs throughout history are often 
both brokers as well as violence specialists. Diverse studies have witnessed to dif-
fering forms of ‘violent entrepreneurs’ (Blok 1974; Volkov 2002), actors who spe-
cialise in violence and mediate access to resources on that basis. While the most 
infamous case may be the protection racketeering of the Sicilian mafia, similar 
phenomena has been observed across the world. Cities in 1990s Russia saw what 
Volkov (2002, p. 1) described as ‘the advance of bandits’, gangsters specialising 
in protection racketeering. In literature from Latin America and the Caribbean the 
roles of gangs and gangsters have been highlighted as playing similar roles (Arias 
2017; Johnson 2005; Rodgers 2006), such as the ‘community dons’ or ‘garrisons’ 
mediating between poor communities and the state in Jamaica (Johnson 2005). In 
South Asia, and particularly India, the figure of the goonda is often examined (Ber-
enschot 2011; Michelutti 2007; Martin and Michelutti 2017). Berenschot (2011), for 
example, has examined how goonda are essential for party politicians to maintain 
local control, helping rig elections, raise money for political campaigns, and gener-
ally enforcing the politicians’ control through violence.
This brief analysis suggests that across many societies violent intermediaries 
play important roles in people’s lives, for example in mediating access to the mar-
ket, state and wider society, although the terms by which these figures are identified 
clearly differ, as do the precise roles they play. This is not to exaggerate empirically 
and claim that all intermediaries are violent, or that the potential for violence is the 
sole or even primary characteristic constituting the power of intermediaries. As oth-
ers have argued, and this study will also show, intermediaries draw from a complex 
array of qualities, which enable them to mediate across different contexts, and main-
tain their status (Auyero 2001). However these arguments do suggest, as Wheeler 
1 Scott (1972) draws a distinction between a patron and a broker. For Scott the difference lies in whether 
or not the figure directly controls the resources they distribute. If they do, they are deemed a patron and 
involved in a ‘two-person exchange’ with a client, and if they do not, they are a broker and involved in 
a ‘three party exchange’ between two parties. In practice, as Scott acknowledges, people are often both. 
Indeed, empirically, many of the figures later discussed have strong dyadic relationships with their fol-
lowers precisely because of their ability to mediate relationships to political or market actors, suggesting 
that it may not be helpful to draw a sharp analytical distinction between the two.
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(2014, p. 73) argues describing a favela in Rio de Janiero, that in many contexts 
‘violence shapes forms of mediation that inform how the state appears to citizens 
and how citizens see their citizenship and make claims on the state’.
Dispersed Violence and Political Order
Establishing a relationship between violence and intermediation draws attention to a 
more challenging question: why, in certain contexts, are intermediaries violent? The 
approach developed below offers a response to this question rooted in an understand-
ing of political order, which builds closely from the concept of a ‘Limited Access 
Order’ (North et al. 2009) and work on ‘political settlements’ (Khan 2010). In many 
societies, the state as it is formally defined, does not hold a monopoly on violence, and 
political order—meaning the absence of widespread and large-scale violence—does 
not therefore originate with a central authority asserting its dominance and enforcing 
laws on this basis, as in the Weberian ideal. In such contexts the ability to use violence 
can be seen as ‘dispersed’ (North et al. 2009), meaning that a broad set of violence 
specialists, often with diverse organisational characters, use violence to promote their 
interests. Among others, this can include mafia, gangsters, political factions, trade 
unions, militia, and state security forces, actors who use violence ‘entrepreneurially’ 
(Blok 1974; Volkov 2002). In such societies political order requires cooperation and 
a balance of power between these differing violence specialists (Arias 2017; Gold-
stein and Arias 2010; Jackman 2018; Khan 2010; North et  al. 2009). As Goldstein 
and Arias (2010, p. 20) argue similarly, political regimes ‘coexist with organized, vio-
lent nonstate actors, and they stand side by side with multiple forms of substate order 
that exist separately from, but in constant interaction with, the state-sanctioned rule of 
law’. This argument resonates closely with studies, which have demonstrated the com-
plex interdependencies between state and non-state violence specialists, and between 
national forms of governance and politics, and community level violence specialists 
(Arias 2017; Jackman 2018; LeBas 2013; Martin and Michelutti 2017; Volkov 2002).
One way of conceptualising the interdependencies between different violence spe-
cialists is through the notion of a ‘ruling coalition’ (North et al. 2009; Khan 2010). 
A ruling coalition is a complex inter-class network of actors, incorporating diverse 
elites and violence specialists both within and outside of the formal state, and organ-
ised as hierarchically linked factions, present throughout society down to the grass-
roots. Political order can be understood as requiring such a coalition to form, the 
coalition being incentivised to cooperate by maintaining mutual privileges, and by 
it excluding and dominating rivals (Ibid). In particular a ‘double balance’ is critical, 
where the capability one has for violence corresponds to economic power (North 
et al. 2009); and when ‘enough of the potential organizers of violence are included 
within the ruling group’ (Khan 2013, p. 34). Indeed, factions can vie for entry into 
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or status within coalitions, and rival coalitions can form to threaten those in power. 
Khan (2010, 2013) offers a way of conceptualising different forms that a ruling coa-
lition can take, arguing that while all coalitions require a degree of support from dif-
ferent hierarchical levels in society, they differ in terms of the factions included, and 
the balance of power between these.2 In practice, the relationships denoted by the 
term ‘coalition’, and the forms of governance this creates on the ground, are com-
plex. As Arias’ (2017) analysis of ‘micro-level armed regimes’ for example argues, 
the degree of consolidated power that non-state actors have differs, as do the levels 
of cooperation that they exhibit with the state.
For the ruling coalition, being in power brings opportunities and resources, which 
those outside of the coalition are denied. These benefits are diverse, including the 
‘manipulation of economic privileges’ (North et al., 2009, p. 122)—for example the 
right to trade, control or have a monopoly over a market—as well as the ability to 
organise politically. Such resources are valuable for many reasons; critically because 
they are needed to incentivise members of a faction and coalition to mobilise or pre-
vent rivals from challenging them (Khan 2010; North et al. 2009). To put it simply, 
a ruling coalition is not viable without resources to maintain it, and when the ruling 
coalition is not stable, political order breaks down. This suggests that the ways in 
which resources are accumulated and distributed by actors within the ruling coali-
tion are essential for maintaining political order, raising the critical question of how 
this is achieved. The proposition here is that one important way in which violence 
specialists accrue resources is through relationships of intermediation. Controlling 
and mediating access to resources can itself provide resources, which violence spe-
cialists may seek as ends in themselves, but which are also instrumental to maintain-
ing the viability of factions, and coalitions as a whole.
Empirically, this may mean that violence specialists themselves directly medi-
ate the access that other people have to resources, or it could also mean that they 
somehow profit from the ways that others do so. Given that the violence specialists 
included within ruling coalitions can have diverse characters organisationally, and 
operate at different hierarchical levels within society, this suggests broad scope for the 
relationships this can denote. Examples may include extortion and protection racket-
eering, controlling employment opportunities, the ability to trade, housing, state ser-
vices and personal security. Again, this is not to suggest that all forms of intermedia-
tion are necessarily controlled by violence specialists. However it does suggest that 
where violent intermediaries are observed, it may be instructive to analyse the roles 
they play and the dynamics such intermediation takes, through the model of political 
order outlined here, and therefore in relation to the concept of a ruling coalition.
2 For Khan (2010) power within ruling coalitions differs vertically (according to the relative power of 
higher and lower level factions), and horizontally (according to the relative power of factions within 
and outside the coalition). Different types of political settlement emerge across these two variables. For 
example, where both lower level and excluded factions are strong, a ‘competitive clientelist’ arrangement 
emerges, characterised by a form of political competition, and regular transitions in power between rul-
ing coalitions.
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Politics, Labour and Violence in Dhaka City
This section explores the framework developed above in Bangladesh through the 
case of the jupri labourers at Karwan Bazar in Dhaka. While it is acknowledged that 
generalisations cannot be drawn from a single case, the study suggests that violence 
is a key skill of intermediaries in this context, and that such intermediaries operate 
within or in opposition to the ruling coalition. The following sections develop these 
arguments empirically, particularly examining the roles of labour leaders, contex-
tualising such intermediaries in relation to the ruling coalition in Bangladesh, and 
exploring two short cases of violent mobilisation.
Coalitions, Parties and Factions in Bangladesh
Following the return to parliamentary democracy in 1991, ruling coalitions in Bang-
ladesh have been mobilised around the country’s two premier political forces: the 
Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Both parties are led 
by political dynasties, which hold widespread and comparable levels of public sup-
port (Khan 2010), and have a strong presence at the grassroots, organised through a 
myriad of different bodies and networks. In many respects the parties mirror each 
other organisationally, and can be seen as pyramids of hierarchically organised fac-
tions, linked through complex patron-client relations (Khan 2010; Suykens 2016). 
Both central parties are supported by wings or associated bodies representing par-
ticular interest groups, and these include students (chattro), youth (jubo), workers 
(sramik), volunteers (swechasebak) and farmers (krishok), identities that are gener-
ally associated with dal in the case of BNP or league in the case of the AL. These 
actors operate as violence specialists, which together with the security forces and 
politicised networks across society, are key actors within the ruling coalition.
Until recently power has oscillated between these parties regularly in a ‘competi-
tive clientelist’ arrangement (Khan 2010). Power changed hands in 1991 (Ershad’s 
military regime to BNP), 1996 (BNP to AL), 2001 (AL to BNP) and through 
2006–2008 (BNP to AL). Once in power, the ruling coalition has access to extensive 
rent-seeking opportunities, leveraging control over the state and market to pursue 
these, while largely excluding rivals. This arrangement has historically enabled all 
actors who have a capability for violence to systematically access the resources that 
ruling brings (Khan 2010). Hence following the election of a new party, a transfer of 
power can be witnessed throughout society, from ministerial offices down to street 
level extortionists and even control over the halls of residence at public universities 
(Ruud 2014). In practice, each transition has been characterised by widespread and 
public violence as the coalitions vie to demonstrate their superior capability for vio-
lence and the legitimacy of their control over society. This typically involves mass 
strikes, street battles, bombings and arson, which are observed across the coun-
try, but centre on Dhaka, and are led by the groups described above. Holding this 
arrangement together has been a ‘caretaker government’ system, where elections are 
conducted under the supervision of a military backed government led by techno-
crats, preventing the incumbent coalition from utilising the apparatus of the state to 
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suppress rivals (Khan 2010; Hassan and Nazneen 2017). By the time this research 
was conducted it was clear that this arrangement had broken down. In early 2014 
the BNP boycotted the general election in response to the AL’s decision to directly 
administer the elections, and this has been accompanied by what appears to be a 
massive consolidation of power by the AL. Indeed, the degree of control that the AL 
has over the state and society has led to descriptions of Bangladesh as a ‘partyarchy’ 
(Hassan and Nazneen 2017), or a ‘party-state’ (Suykens 2017).
Conflict in Bangladesh occurs not only between coalitions, but also within 
them. Coalitions are thus dynamic, as factions manoeuvre and compete for status 
and resources (Khan 2010). Such factionalism is commonplace, and referred to 
through Bengali terms such as daladali and grouping. To seek opportunities and 
prevent rivals from challenging one’s authority within the ruling coalition, politi-
cal factions thus need to show strength. This is demonstrated in different ways, for 
example by gathering people at political events to indicate popular support and man-
power; by mobilising people violently in street protests, fights, killings and bomb-
ings (Andersen 2013; Ruud 2014); and by utilising the legal system to launch police 
cases and have opponents arrested. Such violence can be seen as a ‘performative act’ 
(Berenschot 2011, p. 269), designed to instill in others a sense of one’s power, and 
therefore legitimacy to control resources, and play wider roles such as settling dis-
putes or running extortion rackets. While political leaders stand above their follow-
ers hierarchically and can exercise control over them, they are also therefore depend-
ent upon them, requiring their muscle and loyalty to maintain their status (Ruud 
2014). The way this is achieved is complex, however providing resources and oppor-
tunities is crucial, necessitating political leaders to closely manage the territory and 
economy over which they can exercise authority. Further examining the organisation 
of this ruling coalition at the grassroots in Bangladesh helps illuminate the relation-
ship between violence and intermediation.
Interme diaries and the Jupri Labourers at Karwan Bazar
Studies of bosti (slums) in Dhaka suggest that political leaders and those affiliated 
with them have comprehensive control over local resources such as housing, security, 
markets and utilities, control from which they accumulate wealth, and which is main-
tained through an underlying threat of violence (Banks 2016; Hackenbroch and Hos-
sain 2012; Khan 2000; Suykens 2015). This and subsequent sections build on this 
work to examine such intermediation in the context of the jupri labourers at Karwan 
Bazar. With limited exception (Opel 2000) organised labour has been a neglected 
subject of research in urban Bangladesh, and to my knowledge this study represents 
the first analysis in Dhaka of the relations between labour groups and political parties.
For the jupri labourers gaining access to work, finding opportunities and remain-
ing safe, are not guaranteed by the rule of law, or regulated according to market 
principles, but contingent on the relationships they maintain with senior and more 
powerful actors. Such dependencies provide an anchor to their lives, binding people 
together in complex ways. Being so important, they are the subject of much interest, 
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and can be openly discussed and gossiped about, while at times are contentious and 
even hidden. For the jupri group, and indeed other labourers at the bazar, a key fig-
ure they rely upon for work, security and opportunities are labour leaders. Labour 
leaders are known as sardar, or hodar colloquially, and are a ubiqitious and pow-
erful intermediary, who have received little academic attention in Bangladesh. At 
Karwan Bazar sardar control contracts for distributing goods between the bepari 
and aratdar, and typically organise the coolie (those carrying goods in baskets on 
their heads), the helper (those facilitating this, working by hand), and the rickshaw 
baan (van) drivers (those carrying goods on flat backed rickshaw vans). Sardar 
often have their name suffixed with the term, hence the name of the most proximate 
and powerful labour leader to the jupri group—Dulal sardar. Dulal is now elderly. 
He described to me having worked at Karwan Bazar for over forty years and having 
forty rickshaw van drivers under him. Sardar typically receive daily income from 
the vans that they own and rent to drivers (approximately 80–100 taka a day), along 
with a significant cut of the fee charged by the group to unload or reload the goods. 
People estimate that Dulal sardar earns about 1.5 lakh taka a month (one lakh is one 
hundred thousand).
The jupri group have a contentious relationship with Dulal, and although having 
previously worked under him, had in recent years managed to take control over their 
own contracts, which they managed through the group’s boro bhai (big brother). 
These boro bhai play a similar structural role to sardar, although only managed the 
van drivers themselves, and were not referred to through this term. A younger van 
driver in the group described these boro bhai: ‘Parvez bhai is top. Then Rubel. Then 
“mission” Azad’. These three boro bhai described being from the same ‘batch’ of 
boys who had grown up in NGO centres for street children. Like other labour lead-
ers more generally, they play complex roles in the lives of the labourers under them. 
Relationships are spoken of in terms of whether they ‘adore’ each other, whether 
they care and love each other. Boro bhai are looked to for advice, support, guidance, 
and as well as providing work, they offer the security and respect that their names 
are accorded in the area. They also run savings groups (samiti), and this was a major 
source of income for Parvez, while Rubel earned a cut from managing the contracts 
that the group worked on, as well as renting out the six rickshaw vans he owned. 
The labourers often expressed that ‘you have to have a boro bhai’.
Hierarchically above labour leaders in terms of status and power, are party politi-
cal leaders and the security forces. At and around Karwan Bazar, as in other neigh-
bourhoods of Dhaka, it is the party political actors described above who, along with 
the police, have a dominant capability for violence. As well as the central  AL, a 
number of powerful affiliated bodies operate here including the Jubo League (youth 
wing), Sramik League (workers wing), Swechasebak League (volunteers wing) and 
Krishok League (farmers wing). The ward level leaders of these bodies are well 
known, referred to through the language of “leader”, neta (leader) or more often and 
colloquially boro bhai. These actors themselves look up to senior political authori-
ties such as MPs and Ministers, as well as the internal hierarchy of their particular 
body. A web of actors exist around these leaders, often termed cadre, which has 
connotations of a standing army or force. These cadre are sometimes derogatorily 
referred to as chamcha, meaning a ‘yes man’, someone who sucks up to a leader, 
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always agreeing and praising him. A common form of cadre are “lineman” who 
collect the extortion or tolls (what is locally known as chanda or chaada) from 
street businesses and often also from labourers and their leaders. Operating under 
the police and paramilitary group the Rapid Action Batallion (RAB) are informers, 
known as former or “source” locally. At Karwan Bazar these figures can be labour-
ers, beggars, or full time informers. Some run their own extortion networks on the 
basis of the power accorded to them, such as Shamim, who was a previous gangster 
turned former, while RAB’s main former was a man called Sajid.
Political Dependencies and Violence
A critical way in which boro bhai and sardar mediate access to work, security and 
opportunities for labourers, is through positioning their group in relation to the 
police, informers, and local bodies of the ruling party described above. Political 
leaders and their cadre are publically respected, and at times feared by labourers and 
their leaders because of their capability for violence, which is associated both with 
manpower and the weapons they can wield, as well as their proximity to the police 
and the legal system which they can deploy to their own ends by virtue of being 
within the ruling party. The inequalities in power between labourers and political 
actors mean that labourers can be obliged to mobilise, even violently, in support of 
political leaders, and pay informal tolls or extortion. Every night at Karwan Bazar 
for example, cadre extract money from both labourers and their leaders when veg-
etables are delivered. As everyone knows, a refusal to adhere to these interests could 
easily lead to an individual or group losing an ability to work, facing the violence of 
political cadre or even a police case.
At the same time, labour groups can leverage their muscle to seek opportunities, 
mobilising either in support or opposition to the local political leaders in power. 
Although the Awami League bodies mentioned above are locally powerful, their 
leaders and direct cadre are a small group compared to the size of labour groups. 
Political leaders thus often require relationships with labourers to maintain their 
dominance locally (for example to control rivals, or demonstrate the support they 
hold locally to senior political leaders). As the jupri group often described it: politi-
cal leaders have a need for labourers to demonstrate their strength. The nature of 
these ties differs. Some labour groups are employed on an event-by-event basis 
and are therefore flexible to operate with different political actors, while others are 
tied to a specific body of the Awami League through loyalty or formal registration 
and membership. Some groups of labour thus see these relationships as a means of 
accruing power, whether it is to gain territory (such as contracts for work) or a desire 
to control extortion networks, and often look up with jealousy at the wealth of politi-
cal leaders and cadre. As the case of the jupri group below demonstrates, labour 
groups may also see an opposition leader as offering the best route to power, and 
thus labour groups can threaten the stability of actors within the ruling coalition.
The jupri group are renowned—so they often told me—as the best fighters 
at the bazar. I was safe because I was with them, and if they fight, then their 
enemies will run away to Bandarban (a remote hilly district in the South-East of 
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Bangladesh), as one member put it. Collectively they brag about fighting, about 
how scared they made someone, about how strong they are as individuals or how 
notorious particular members are. Status in the group itself was contingent on 
being able to fight, invoke fear and be “daring” as it was put; and when discuss-
ing political opportunities and work, they would often generalise that ‘you have 
to fight’. Among the three boro bhai, Rubel principally manages work, while 
Azad and Parvez specialise more particularly in violence. Rubel would refer to 
Azad as the “fireman” (said while indicating a pistol), and a ‘very powerful man’ 
(indicating stabbing motions) who served twelve years in Dhaka Central Jail for 
crimes committed during the reign of picchi Hannan, a gangster who previously 
controlled the bazar (Jackman 2018).
At the time of research, the jupri group were aligned with the opposition party, 
the BNP. These connections came primarily from Parvez and Azad who had affil-
iated the group with a local BNP leader prior to the 2014 general election, in 
anticipation that the party would contest and win the election (neither of which 
they did). Junior members of the group described having to trust these affilia-
tions, not ask too many questions, and follow instructions from these boro bhai. 
In the period of political conflict preceding and during research, Parvez was paid 
around 30,000 taka per occasion to lead the jupri labourers into fights and skir-
mishes at the BNP leader’s behest. But alongside this, the group’s political affili-
ations were highly complex and they would also participate in Awami League 
events, as a labourer Liton explained:
Sometimes we do krishok [farmers], sometimes jubo [youth], sometimes 
chattro [student], whoever comes and gives us money. Sometimes we’ll 
even do BNP. It’s no problem, we can go to whichever meeting because we 
haven’t signed with any. We haven’t got registration with any.
On one of the occasions I witnessed, the Krishok League secretary from nearby 
Tejgaon arrived in his oversized suit and clipboard, and was greeted by cheers 
from the group. He immediately gave 100 taka to the group for tea, and then said 
he needed twenty people for a rally at a nearby area Farmgate. I resisted calls to 
come along, and the group left cheering the name of a local politician. Although 
the group would often explain their attendance in economic terms—they give us 
200 taka to go, we can fill our stomachs, why wouldn’t we go?! as one of the 
group put it—alongside this sat more complicated reasons, as Rubel explained:
Those who are involved with the BNP, they go to the Awami meetings if 
they are invited. It’s like a tangle, it’s complex for us. If today I am with 
Awami and I invite you to go to a meeting and you refuse, then I will inform 
the police and they will come to catch you. That’s why we go. We have to 
go to save ourselves.
A key role of labour leaders such as the jupri boro bhai is then to navigate these 
relationships with political leaders, seeking security and opportunities, while also 
mitigating risks. Such dependencies are in practice complex. Public mobilisa-
tion for one party may for example conceal loyalty to another. Although the jupri 
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group needed to demonstrate support for the Awami League, their capability for 
violence also gave them a degree of protection from these actors. Other groups 
of labourers had to pay local lineman chanda when unloading vegetables (often 
5 taka per sack) while the jupri group were exempt. The fact that labour groups 
are relied upon by political leaders suggests we can see such groups as one of the 
lowest levels of violence specialists within and outside the ruling coalition.
Taking Territory
Operating as a labour leader like Dulal sardar or the jupri boro bhai represents a 
privileged economic and political position. It signifies an ability to control work, 
profit from a value chain, and also pursue a political agenda. As such, it is a coveted 
status. Leaders however differ in the reach of their economic control, and groups 
are in competition for more work. Key to the levels of control a group has is their 
capability for violence. This capability is not however simply defined by an ability 
for brute violence, but critically by one’s status in relation to the ruling coalition. 
Groups more closely aligned to this coalition can draw upon the strength of actors 
within that coalition, who themselves can publically mobilise on the streets and uti-
lise the powers of the state, giving a significant disadvantage to those aligned to the 
opposition. Events at the end of 2014 illustrate these points in the lives of the jupri 
labourers.
The 15th of December 2014 represented a break in the jupri group’s usual rou-
tine of sleep, chatting and cigarettes in the early evening. By around 9 pm the group 
had amassed around seventy of their members and blockaded a main entrance to 
the bazar. Their primary grievance was Dulal sardar, with whom tension had been 
rising the preceding month. They often called Dulal and other sardar “cheater” 
and thieves, and looked enviously at his control of contracts, while also describing 
him trying to take chanda from them, thereby taking a cut of their earnings. Having 
blocked the main entrance to their side of the bazar, the group demanded that the 
market authorities got rid of Dulal sardar, knowing that these authorities would not 
fight them off themselves and expressing: ‘if we don’t get the work, no-one will!’ and 
‘it is either us or the sardar!’
The strike was ostensibly successful, and over the following days a series of 
negotiations took place, including with the Tejgaon central Awami League leader, 
and reportedly even the local MP. From this an agreement emerged that Dulal could 
keep the ownership of his 12 vans but the jupri group would take over his con-
tracts. Dulal sardar became simply Dulal, and could not return to the bazar for fear 
of being beaten. Tension however remained, and less than a week later it became 
apparent that Dulal, the elderly and experienced sardar of decades, was not to be 
stopped so easily. In the evening of the 21st of December Dulal sardar hired a fac-
tion of the Chattro League to fight off the jupri group. Salam, a jupri labourer, later 
described the event:
We completely beat them up. Dulal sardar paid students from the universities 
and colleges, they came at us at around 9 pm in front of the bank. It lasted for 
two hours. When one of them hit Parvez that’s when we all went crazy and 
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fucked them up. Azad brought his guys and smashed a hook into one guy’s 
head. He’s a chamcha. He’s in Dhaka Medical and will take six months to 
recover. They were taught the lesson of their lifetime
Despite winning the fight, jupri were defeated when the Chattro League called in 
the police, forcing the group to flee. The group scattered and the Chattro League 
subsequently took control of the jupri lane, posting men in the area to make sure 
they did not return. Rubel described the situation
After we took the work Dulal offered us 3.5 lakh to give it back, but we didn’t 
agree. He acted over us, spread a rumour and arranged the fighting. Because 
we didn’t take their money, they brought the “killer”. They had 70 people. 
They brought the boys from Chattro League and paid them 2 lakh to fight, 
though they offered us 3.5 lakh. Our mistake was that we didn’t accept the 
money.
The jupri group’s BNP association was fundamental to their defeat. The rumour ref-
erenced above was that they supported the BNP, and indeed Azad had drawn on 
other BNP muscle in the fight, had been arrested and remained in prison during the 
rest of the research. Others were released but remained fugitives, as Rubel explained, 
‘because they did BNP and their party doesn’t have any power now’. Meanwhile 
Dulal managed to maintain his regained status through payments to the AL for pro-
tection, but was too cautious to return to the bazar. Rubel and the jupri retained their 
contracts, and Parvez continued running his samiti, though only turned up infre-
quently at the bazar. Through the conflict, a faction within the group began to dis-
tance itself from the leadership, and Rubel began to publically soften his portrayal of 
their affiliation, expressing ‘we aren’t BNP, we aren’t Awami, we are workers’, and 
‘I’m both BNP and Awami. I do both, it depends on the situation’. But beneath the 
surface the group remained covertly loyal to the BNP, a decision that would make 
life even more precarious for Rubel and Parvez.
Bombings and Arson: Threatening the Ruling Coalition
Labour leaders not only seek opportunities for themselves and their group through 
competing locally for more control over work, but also directly seek status within 
the ruling coalition. Demonstrating a commitment to one of the major political par-
ties, particularly when they are not in power, is a strong basis for future claims of 
increased access to work, formal status within local bodies of the party, or informal 
sources of income such as extortion rackets. For political leaders, labourers such as 
the jupri group are a source of relatively cheap muscle—they are poor, familiar with 
violence having grown up on the streets, and eager for opportunities. As such, they 
are particularly relied upon for more extreme acts of violence. As events in early 
2015 however showed, such mobilisation may promise greater rewards, but comes 
with high levels of risk to those involved.
During the period described here, Bangladesh was highly unsettled politi-
cally. Khaleda Zia, the leader of the BNP, was put under effective house arrest 
(though in her office) and her party’s attempts to organise blockades (abarodh) 
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and strikes (hartal) had very limited success. A few years previously calling a 
hartal had meant a serious threat of mass violence, but by this period the abil-
ity of the opposition to mobilise activists on the streets was widely recognised 
as diminished, as it continues to be as of mid-2018. As a result, the opposition 
appeared to resort to more desperate and extreme measures to demonstrate their 
capability for violence and publically question the ability of the AL to maintain 
order. Between January 5th and February 24th there were approximately 119 
deaths due to political violence in the country (Bergman 2015), including rul-
ing party and opposition activists, as well as many civilians targeted in molatov 
cocktail blasts in public spaces and petrol bombs on buses.
At Karwan Bazar it was the jupri group who coordinated bombings and arson 
on behalf of the BNP during this period. These targeted buses, police and the 
underpass beneath Kazi Nazrul Islam Avenue. On at least one occasion they 
made national news (The Daily Star 2015). The report describes ‘miscreants’ 
throwing ‘at least two crude bombs’ at a bus in the north of the bazar, hurt-
ing the driver. Rather than implement these themselves, Rubel and Parvez used 
younger children who were scavengers and thieves also living at the bazar, some 
of whom had older siblings working in the group. Such use of street children in 
political violence is common in Dhaka (Atkinson-Sheppard 2015). For the boro 
bhai in the jupri group, this mobilisation was an investment, a way of signal-
ling the strength of their faction and make a claim on their future role in the 
bazar were the BNP to get into power. It turned out to be a serious miscalcula-
tion. Around the  10th of February Parvez was—so the jupri group allege—sud-
denly taken by RAB. Members of the group who saw the incident described the 
informer Sajid walking along with RAB who were dressed in white clothes (civil 
clothes). Pointing out Parvez, they allegedly grabbed him, and took him to near 
a government office where they tied him to another rickshaw van and beat him 
publically, targeting his hands and feet, before arresting him. Almost 2  weeks 
later, RAB had reportedly returned around 7:30  pm taking Rubel, and when I 
finished my research he was still in Dhaka Central Jail. A number of children 
associated with the group had also been arrested and charged with vandalising 
cars under BNP instruction.
Some of the group suspected that Parvez had been beaten and given infor-
mation and that RAB had a long list of people they would take one by one. A 
number of the group reflected that Rubel would get out, but would have to pay 
huge amounts of money. ‘Maybe when he gets out Rubel will kill the former’, 
one reflected. By the end of February Parvez had been released on bail, hav-
ing paid 50,000 taka, his hands and feet were fractured, and though he could 
walk, he could not work. His samiti had broken up and he therefore no longer 
received the daily income from this. He had however found new employment, 
which gives insight into how the ruling coalition co-opts those with a capabil-
ity for violence: he had become a RAB informer. Liton described how they had 
beaten him and persuaded him with money, and ‘he’s really proud. He thinks 
he’s a big person again, saying that he’s now with RAB. He still has the BNP 
links, but they are quiet now’.
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Conclusion
This article began by suggesting that in many societies there is a relationship 
between intermediation and violence (Arias 2017; Berenschot 2011; Blok 1974; 
Volkov 2002; Wheeler 2014), and this was further evidenced by the case of the 
jupri labourers in Dhaka. The question then posed was why, in these contexts, 
such intermediaries are violent. The response to this question developed is rooted 
in an understanding of political order. When political order in a society rests 
not on a central state, which has consolidated the means of violence but rather 
on a balance of power between diverse violence specialists (North et  al. 2009), 
it was argued that intermediation can be a means by which these actors accrue 
resources. Such resources were suggested to be important not only in their own 
right, but also instrumentally, in enabling violence specialists to maintain their 
factions, and for a ruling coalition to be sustained as a whole. Put simply: politi-
cal order requires the dominance of a ruling coalition, a ruling coalition requires 
resources, and intermediation represents a means by which resources can be 
accrued.
The case of the jupri group supports this argument not only be showing the 
importance of violence to certain intermediaries, but by demonstrating that the 
ability of intermediaries to use violence is closely connected to their status in 
relation to the ruling coalition. Labourers are looked to as a source of muscle and 
finance for political leaders both within and outside the ruling coalition who need 
to maintain and demonstrate their own capability for violence, while labour lead-
ers utilise this skill to seek opportunities and mitigate the risks that such depend-
encies pose. The failure of the jupri group to navigate this successfully and the 
ensuing beatings and arrests allegedly at the hands of the state illustrate the grav-
ity of the choices made. They furthermore illuminate in microcosm Bangladesh’s 
recent political transition away from competitive clientelism and towards the con-
tinued dominance of the current ruling party, highlighting how the security forces 
and their informers target, control and co-opt opposition party activists.
These arguments have a number of analytical implications for our understand-
ing of violent intermediaries. First, because economic mediation can be a power 
base for actors within or outside the ruling coalition, this suggests we should 
see economic and political mediation as closely interlinked. Second, while we 
can draw attention to particular individuals—such as the boro bhai in the jupri 
group—the authority of such figures in this context is constituted not only by their 
individual qualities, but crucially, but their relationship to a group of followers on 
whom they can depend, and who they can motivate to mobilise. There is therefore 
strong reason to understand intermediaries in relation to factions. Third, these 
arguments suggest that intermediation should be seen as a locus of local political 
struggles—it is a source of resources, instrumental to political mobilisation, and 
therefore a coveted status. Fourth, the capability for violence of intermediaries 
should be seen as complex, and far more than brute force. It incorporates an abil-
ity to draw on more sophisticated tools such as police cases and imprisonment, 
all of which may only need to be threatened in order to be felt. Finally, violence 
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should be seen as one among other skills that such intermediaries possess. As 
described at Karwan bazar, labour leaders have a number of qualities including 
being caring and having a moral authority, raising complex questions about how 
these interact and are co-constituted.
The relevance of these arguments to other contexts beyond Karwan Bazar, Dhaka 
and Bangladesh remains an open question, and as made clear, generalisations clearly 
cannot be drawn from a single case. It is likely that the relationship between a ruling 
coalition, intermediation and violence will vary in a number of ways: the violence 
specialists dominant in any society may differ (Jackman 2018), as will their relative 
power one to another (Arias 2017), and likely also the extent to which intermedia-
tion serves as a source of resources. In different contexts violence may be far less 
important a skill for intermediaries, raising the broader question of why such actors 
exist in specific contexts. It is hoped that the arguments and case developed here 
offer avenues for further research on violent intermediaries both in Bangladesh and 
beyond.
Acknowledgements This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (Grant 
Numbers ES/J50015X/1  and  ES/P500653/1). I would like to thank Joe Devine, Geof Wood, Mathilde 
Maitrot and Sam Hickey for reviewing earlier drafts of this article, as well as the guidance of anonymous 
reviewers.
Compliance with Ethical Standards 
Conflict of interests The author confirms that there is no conflict of interest
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Inter-
national License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and 
the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Andersen, M.K. 2013. The Politics of Politics: Youth Mobilization, Aspirations and the Threat of Vio-
lence at Dhaka University. PhD Thesis, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark.
Arias, E.D. 2017. Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Atkinson-Sheppard, S. 2015. The Gangs of Bangladesh: Exploring Organized Crime, Street Gangs and 
‘Illicit Child Labourers’ in Dhaka. Criminology & Criminal Justice 16 (2): 1–17.
Auyero, J. 2001. Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita. Durham: 
Duke University Press.
Baiocchi, G., and B.T. Connor. 2008. The Ethos in the Polis: Political Ethnography as a Mode of Inquiry. 
Sociology Compass 2 (1): 139–155.
Berenschot, W. 2010. Rioting as Maintaining Relations: Hindu-Muslim Violence and Political Mediation 
in Gujarat, India. Civil Wars 11 (4): 414–433.
Berenschot, W. 2011. Everyday Mediation: The Politics of Public Service Delivery in Gujarat, India. 
Development and Change 41 (5): 883–905.
Bergman, D. 2015. Political Crisis of 2015—Analysis of Death. Bangladesh Politico blog. http://bangl 
adesh polit ico.blogs pot.co.uk/2015/01/polit ical-crisi s-2015-analy sis-of-death s.html. Retrieved 24 
Feb 2015.
722 D. Jackman 
Bierschenk, T., J. Chauveau, and J.O. de Sardan. 2002. Local Development Brokers in Africa: The Rise 
of a New Social Category. Working Paper 13, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität.
Blok, A. 1974. The Mafia of a Sicilian Village. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Chatterjee, P. 2004. The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Devine, J. 2002. Ethnography of a Policy Process: A Case Study of Land Redistribution in Bangladesh. 
Public Administration and Development 22 (5): 403–414.
Gay, R. 1998. Rethinking Clientelism: Demands, Discourses and Practices in Contemporary Brazil. 
European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 65: 7–24.
Goldstein, D., and E.D. Arias. 2010. Violent Pluralism: Understanding the New Democracies of Latin 
America. In Violent Democracies in Latin America, ed. D. Goldstein and E.D. Arias, 1–34. Dur-
ham: Duke University Press.
Hackenbroch, K., and S. Hossain. 2012. “The Organised Encroachment of the Powerful”—Everyday 
Practices of Public Space and Water Supply in Dhaka. Bangladesh. Planning Theory and Practice 
13 (3): 397–420.
Hansen, T.B., and O. Verkaaik. 2009. On Everyday Mythologies in the City. Critique of Anthropology 29 
(1): 5–26.
Hassan, M., and S. Nazneen. 2017. Violence and the Breakdown of the Political Settlement: An Uncer-
tain Future for Bangladesh? Conflict, Security and Development 17 (3): 205–223.
Jackman, D. 2018. The Decline of Gangsters and the Politicization of Violence in Urban Bangladesh. 
Development and Change.
Johnson, H.N. 2005. Incivility: The Politics of ‘People on the Margins’ in Jamaica”. Political Studies 53: 
579–597.
Khan, M.I.A. 2000. Struggle for Survival: Networks and Relationships in a Bangladesh Slum. PhD thesis, 
University of Bath, Bath, UK.
Khan, M.H. 2010. Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions. SOAS 
Working Paper.
Khan, M.H. 2013. Bangladesh: Economic Growth in a Vulnerable Limited Access Order. In In the 
Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics and the Problems of Development, ed. D. North, J. Wallis, 
S. Webb, and B. Weingast, 1–69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
LeBas, A. 2013. Violence and Urban Order in Nairobi, Kenya and Lagos, Nigeria. Studies in Compara-
tive International Development 48 (3): 240–262.
Martin, N., and L. Michelutti. 2017. Protection Rackets and Party Machines: Comparative Ethnographies 
of “Mafia Raj” in North India. Asian Journal of Social Science 45 (6): 693–723.
Meehan, P., and S. Plonski. 2017. Brokering the Margins: a Review of Concepts and Methods. Working 
Paper No. 1. SOAS and the University of Bath.
Michelutti, L. 2007. The Vernacularization of Democracy: Political Participation and Popular Politics in 
North India. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 13: 639–656.
North, D., J. Wallis, and B.R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for 
Interpreting Recorded Human History. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Opel, A.E.A. 2000. The Social Content of Labour Markets in Dhaka Slums. Journal of International 
Development 12 (5): 735–750.
Ribot, J.C., and N.L. Peluso. 2003. A Theory of Access. Rural Ethnography 68 (2): 153–181.
Rodgers, D. 2006. Living in the Shadow of Death: Gangs, Violence and Social Order in Urban Nicara-
gua, 1996–2002. Journal of Latin American Studies 38 (2): 267–292.
Ruud, A.E. 2014. The Political Bully in Bangladesh. In Patronage as Politics in South Asia, ed. A. Pilia-
vsky, 303–325. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scott, J.C. 1972. Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia. The American Political 
Science Review 66 (1): 91–113.
Stokes, S.C., T. Dunning, M. Nazareno, and V. Brusco. 2013. Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puz-
zle of Distributive Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Suykens, B. 2015. The Land that Disappeared: Forceful Occupation, Disputes and the Negotiation of 
Landlord Power in a Bangladesh Bastee. Development and Change 46 (3): 486–507.
Suykens, B. 2016. Segmentary Opposition, Vertical Integration and the Structure of Political Relations in 
Bangladesh: A Descriptive Model. Journal of Asian and African Studies 52 (8): 1141–1158.
Suykens, B. 2017. The Bangladesh Party-State: A Diachronic Comparative Analysis of Party-Political 
Regimes. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 55 (2): 187–213.
723Violent Intermediaries and Political Order in Bangladesh 
The Daily Star. 2015. Bus Driver Hurt in Karwan Bazar Crude Bomb Blast. http://www.theda ilyst ar.net/
bus-drive r-hurt-in-karwa n-bazar -crude -bomb-blast -61606 . Accessed 10 Dec 2015.
Tilly, C. 2003. The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Tilly, C., and S. Tarrow. 2007. Contentious Politics. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
Volkov, V. 2002. Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism. New 
York: Cornell University Press.
Von Lieres, B., and Piper, L (eds.). 2014. Mediated Citizenship: The Informal Politics of Speaking for 
Citizens in the Global South. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wheeler, J. 2014. ‘Parallel Power’ in Rio de Janeiro: Coercive Mediators and the Fragmentation of Citi-
zenship in the Favela. In Mediated Citizenship: The Informal Politics of Speaking for Citizens in the 
Global South, ed. B. Von Lieres and L. Piper, 72–89. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wolf, E. 1956. Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico. American Anthropologist. 
New Series 58 (6): 1065–1078.
Wood, G. 2003. Staying Secure, Staying Poor: The “Faustian Bargain”. World Development 31 (3): 
455–471.
Wood, G. 2010. The Security of Agency: Towards a Sociology of Poverty. Paper Presented at Promoting 
Social Inclusion in South Asia: Policies, Pitfalls and the Analysis of Welfare/Insecurity Regimes, 
University of Bath.
